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Theme: After decades of ongoing intercommunal disputes between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots, and for the first time since 2004 when a peace process brokered by the 
UN failed, the leaders of the two communities on the island have re-launched negotiations 
for a federal solution. 
 
 
Summary: In September 2008 direct negotiations were launched in Cyprus. This round in 
the 44 year-old peace process represents both the last and the best chance to achieve 
peace on the island. The last chance because since the fateful referendum over the UN-
brokered Annan Plan in April 2004, while the peace process stagnated, dynamics on the 
ground have reduced the likelihood of a federal solution on the island; the best chance 
because the peace process is led by two moderate leaders, Demetris Christofias and 
Mehmet Ali Talat, who have demonstrated their readiness to compromise by starting 
negotiations over a comprehensive settlement and agreeing on a set of confidence 
building measures. Yet this does not mean that a federal solution is on the short-term 
horizon. On the Greek Cypriot side there is still an important source of resistance against 
a federal power-sharing deal. On the Turkish Cypriot side, enthusiasm for federalism and 
EU accession in 2008 is far below what it was in 2004. Furthermore, since 2007 political 
turmoil in Turkey alongside the reluctance of several EU member states to proceed with 
Turkey’s EU accession process, might constrain the Turkish government’s ability to 
deliver on Cyprus. Within this context, the role of the EU in generating incentives within a 
Cypriot-owned and UN-mediated peace process is critical. This would mean closely 
monitoring the peace process and exerting pressure on all sides, delivering on the 
promises made to the Turkish Cypriots to lift their state of international isolation and re-
energising Turkey’s accession process. 
 
 
 
Analysis: On 3 September 2008 direct negotiations were launched on the island of 
Cyprus. This latest round in the 44-year-old peace process can be viewed as representing 
both the best and the last chance to achieve peace on the Eastern Mediterranean island, 
which has been physically divided between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities since 1974, following the coup d’état by the Greek military junta and the 
subsequent invasion of the north by Turkey. The best chance because, whereas the past 
negotiations were led by hardliners in either one community or both, this Cypriot-owned 
peace process is led by two moderate leaders, Demetris Christofias (President of the 
Republic of Cyprus and leader of the leftist party AKEL) and Mehmet Ali Talat (President 
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Turkey, and leader of the 
leftist party CTP), also known for their good personal rapport and their party political 
affinities. The last chance because since the fateful referendum over the UN-brokered 
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Annan Plan in April 2004,1 while the peace process stagnated,2 dynamics on the ground 
have been all but frozen. As the Annan Plan became a fading memory, the prospects for 
reunification on the basis of a loose federal solution became increasingly dim. Taking the 
upper hand instead have been the two opposite ends of the spectrum of possible 
solutions: on the one hand reunification into a unitary state, as desired by the Greek 
Cypriot side; on the other, two separate states, as preferred or not opposed by the Turkish 
Cypriot side. An interesting manifestation of these trends has been in the property realm, 
in which the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey, attempting to fend away the myriad 
property cases filed at the European Court of Human Rights, have established their own 
Property Commission, adjudicating on cases brought to the Court by Greek Cypriot 
property owners in northern Cyprus. While far from representing a mass-scale trend, over 
300 owners have already applied to this Commission since its entry into force in 2006, 
and 30 cases have been settled, principally through compensation. 
 
Against all odds, the Greek Cypriot public reversed the negative swing of the Cyprus 
pendulum with its vote in February 2008. By relegating the former President Tassos 
Papadopoulos to a humiliating third place in the presidential race and ultimately electing 
the AKEL’ candidate, Demetris Christofias, the Greek Cypriots signalled their will for 
political change. In a mere month after the Greek Cypriot presidential elections, the 
dormant peace process was kick-started again. On 21 March the two leaders met to 
launch a new process, which initially saw the establishment of six inter-communal working 
groups in April 2008, meeting twice a week and covering the principal items on the conflict 
settlement agenda: governance and power-sharing, EU matters, property, security and 
guarantees, economy and territory. Seven technical committees were also set up to 
discuss crime, commerce, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian issues, 
health and the environment. Moreover on 23 May 2008, Christofias and Talat agreed on a 
joint statement declaring that a solution would entail a bi-zonal and bi-communal 
federation, with a single international personality and with a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish 
Cypriot constituent state enjoying equal political status. This was followed by statement on 
1 July in which the leaders agreed in principle that a solution would entail a single 
sovereignty and citizenship on the island. On 25 July a final review of the progress in the 
working groups and technical committees was completed and the two leaders produced a 
joint statement where they pledged that as in 2004 ‘[t]he agreed solution will be put to 
separate simultaneous referenda’.3 Full-fledged negotiations commenced with a formal 
ceremony on 3 September 2008. 
 
Alongside these efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement, the two Cypriot leaders 
have also moved forward on confidence-building measures (CBMs). Most notable in this 
respect was the opening of the Ledra Street/Lokmaci crossing in April 2008 and more 
crossings, specifically at Limnitis/Yeşilırmak, are on the negotiating table. Further 
progress was made by the technical committees. In particular, agreements were reached 
through the committees on the crossing of ambulances across the green line, trilingual 
(Greek, Turkish and English) road signs across the island, cooperation on public health 
issues and repair work on two Greek Orthodox churches in northern Cyprus in June 
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2008.4 More was promised through the 25 July statement mentioned above. In the area of 
environmental protection, the sides agreed to prevent illegal dumping sites in the buffer 
zone, to exchange information between environmental experts and to cooperate on the 
prevention of wildfires. Further CBMs included cooperation in waste management, raising 
bi-communal awareness for water conservation, dealing with quarrying, biodiversity 
protection, marine management and the management of chemical, asbestos and 
historical pollution. With respect to cultural heritage, the parties agreed to compile a list of 
immovable cultural heritage items and additional restoration projects are to be 
determined. Guidelines are to be produced for the development of an interactive 
educational computer program. In the area of crisis management, mechanisms for 
cooperation are envisaged. Finally, cooperation in crime and criminal matters is to be 
enhanced through the exchange of information and intelligence. 
 
The mere fact that direct negotiations have started and that beyond them the two leaders 
seem determined to build trust and confidence between the two communities is enough to 
inject cautious optimism even in the most cynical observer of the prolonged Cyprus 
conflict. Moreover, the fact that this peace process has been marketed and sold as a 
‘Cypriot-owned’ process raises hopes even further. Indeed, a critical lesson drawn from 
the Annan Plan process is the need for conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus to be 
perceived as Cypriot-owned. True, the Annan Plan had been largely drawn up by the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and their respective negotiating teams, building 
upon talks carried out between them over the decades. The UN team had made bridging 
proposals, suggested new ideas and fixed time frames only when compromise eluded the 
leaders. Yet the mainstream narrative within the Greek Cypriot community, captured and 
led by the ‘No’ camp in the south, was that the Plan had been imposed upon the Cypriots 
by foreign agents. In turn, the public perception among Greek Cypriots of the Annan Plan 
process was of excessive external meddling, which reawakened embedded anti-colonial 
sentiments and fears. Regardless of the actual truthfulness of this narrative, the fact that it 
took hold within the Greek Cypriot community created a new reality to be reckoned with. 
Hence, the view gradually consolidated both within and beyond Cyprus that a new peace 
process had to see Cypriots sitting squarely in the driving seat, determining the 
substance, procedures and timeframes of negotiations. The international community and 
the UN in particular would confine themselves to a ‘good offices’ role. The 21 March 
process and the ensuing launch of direct negotiations have been unequivocally Cypriot. 
The process has been launched, determined and carried out by Cypriots, with the UN, 
and indeed all other external actors, being hardly visible and keeping to a strictly 
supporting role. 
 
Last but not least, despite trends on the ground oscillating between centralised unification 
and complete separation, the parameters agreed by the two Cypriot leaders remain the 
only ones on which a second-best compromise is possible and thus which could obtain 
(narrow) majority support in both communities in separate referendums. A spring 2008 
opinion poll carried out by the Centre for European Policy Studies reveals that both 
communities converge on the idea that the basis for negotiations should be the 1977-79 
High-Level Agreements on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, with 63% of Greek 
Cypriots and 77% of Turkish Cypriots viewing this basis as either tolerable, satisfactory or 
desirable. This is confirmed by the fact that the two communities also converge on a 
‘Bizonal Bicommunal Federation with Political Equality’, with 75% of Greek Cypriots and 
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90% of Turkish Cypriots viewing this final outcome as either tolerable, satisfactory or 
desirable.5 
 
This notwithstanding, these critical signals that certainly warrant cautious optimism are 
insufficient to nourish the expectation that the 21 March process can or will deliver in the 
short-term, as first anticipated by Christofias and Talat. Beginning with the Greek Cypriot 
side, despite the election of Christofias, the truth of the matter is that a hard third of the 
public remains firmly opposed to the power-sharing compromises necessary to reach 
peace with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. Indicative of this is that while the hardliner 
Papadopoulos lost the presidential race, he did so by a narrow margin of 8,000-9,000 
votes, suggesting that over one third of the public continues to back his nationalist stance. 
Secondly –and related–, Christofias won the presidency in the second round of voting 
because both the nationalist DIKO (Papadopolous’ party) as well as the nationalist EDEK 
and Greens backed his candidacy against the liberal DISY candidate Cassoulides. 
Furthermore, while Christofias as President and his party AKEL have overarching power, 
this is no guarantee for compromise with the Turkish Cypriots. AKEL as a party and 
Christofias as its leader have lost much of their pro-solution credentials since the turn of 
the century and particularly with the Annan Plan debacle. While representing historically 
the warmest partners of the Turkish Cypriots, AKEL has demonstrated it can act in a 
highly pragmatic and at times opportunistic manner, engaging in unwieldy coalition politics 
with nationalist parties and rejecting the Annan Plan, arguably less out of conviction than 
out of convenience –so as not to be on the losing side of a referendum–. As a matter of 
principle, instead, Christofias might turn out to be no less of a hard nut to crack than his 
predecessor on issues such as demilitarisation, Turkey’s guarantorship, refugees and the 
liberalisation of the freedoms of movement, settlement and property. All this within a 
structural context which has remained unchanged since 2004: Cyprus as an EU member 
state with little or no pressure coming from either its EU partners or any other external 
actor to make the concessions on power-sharing and bi-zonality needed to reach a 
compromise agreement with the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
Turning north, the Turkish Cypriots have borne the brunt of the Cyprus stalemate in 2004-
08, having been let down by the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan and by the 
unfulfilled promises of the international community to lift their state of international 
isolation. This has meant that Turkish Cypriot enthusiasm for federalism and EU 
accession in 2008 is far below what it was in 2004. Some polls conducted in 2007 and 
2008 among Turkish Cypriots suggest that support for federalism is waning in northern 
Cyprus.6 The Turkish Cypriots today are disillusioned, sceptical and more divided 
compared with the heydays of the Annan Plan, when empowered and united by their 
overthrow of the veteran leader Rauf Denktaş they were willing to take a step into the 
unknown with the Annan Plan. Furthermore, the little payback received for having 
undergone an effective regime change and accepted the Annan Plan also means that we 
are unlikely to see the 2003-04 levels of civil society and popular mobilisation in favour of 
a compromise solution in northern Cyprus today. Disillusioned and sceptical of the 
prospects for a loose federal agreement, the Turkish Cypriots feel increasingly inclined to 
concentrate on their internal well-being and, in the absence of palatable alternatives, 
direct their foreign policy efforts towards the lifting of their international isolation. 
                                                 
5 E. Kaymak, A. Lordos & N. Tocci (2008), Building Confidence in Peace: Public Opinion and the Cyprus 
Peace Process, CEPS, Brussels. 
6 The results of a KADEM poll released in January 2007 demonstrated that 65% of Turkish Cypriots favoured 
a two state solution (http://acturca.wordpress.com/2007/02/02/turkish-cypriots-in-favour-of-coexstence-of-two-
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Mehmet Ali Talat is not only constrained by domestic politics; he is stuck between the rock 
of Turkish Cypriot public disillusionment and the hard place of Turkish political turmoil. 
Since 2007 we have witnessed the escalating political conflict between the AKP 
government and the ‘Kemalist establishment’, comprising not only the opposition party 
CHP but also the judiciary, the Turkish Armed Forces and key elements within state 
institutions, the media and the Turkish intelligentsia. This escalating tension was 
manifested first with the debacle over Abdullah Gül’s election to the presidency in 2007. 
Rather than subsiding after the July 2007 parliamentary elections in which the AKP was 
awarded a second term in office, the tension exacerbated with the controversy over the 
headscarf issue in the winter of 2007-08, culminating with the Constitutional Court’s case 
to close the AKP and ban from politics several of its parliamentarians (including the Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan) for alleged anti-secular activities. When the 
Constitutional Court ruled in July 2008 to fine rather than to close and ban the party and 
its politicians, most –both within and outside Turkey– sighed in relief. The closure would 
have most certainly triggered a freeze (if not a complete halt) of Turkey’s EU accession 
process and generated an escalation of the domestic political crisis to unprecedented 
heights. Yet the Constitutional Court’s decision has not entailed a resolution of the crisis, 
putting Turkey firmly back on the track of domestic reform and “EU-isation”. It has rather 
meant putting a cap on the crisis, with the secular establishment maintaining a close eye 
on the AKP and the latter turning its back (so far) to the chorus of calls from both within 
and beyond Turkey to restart the reform process. Within this context of continued yet 
contained political crisis alongside the reluctance of several EU member states to re-
energise Turkey’s EU accession process, can the AKP government, which struggles to 
reengage in a meaningful process of domestic reform, deliver on Cyprus? While a mood 
of cautious optimism prevails in Ankara regarding the Cyprus question, the answer to the 
question is all but evident. 
 
Conclusions: So where does all this leave us? Developments in Cyprus since February 
2008 are certainly positive compared to the dearth of good news coming from the Eastern 
Mediterranean island in recent years. The undeniable truth is that more has been 
achieved in the last six months than over the last four years of stalemate. Yet precisely 
because of these reasons for optimism and the fact that this Cypriot-owned peace 
process may represent the last chance to reunify the island on the basis of a loose federal 
agreement, external parties cannot simply sit aside and watch. Particularly in view of the 
asymmetries in powers, incentives and contexts within the conflict, but also in view of the 
responsibility shared by external actors for the 2004-08 impasse, the latter –first and 
foremost the EU– ought to play a decisive role. This does not entail embarking on a 
mediation role, which it cannot do effectively given that since 2004 it has become part and 
parcel of the Cyprus conflict. The role of the EU would be that of acting in support of and 
generating incentives within a Cypriot-owned and UN-mediated peace process as well as 
acting alongside the negotiation process in order to raise confidence between the two 
communities, in the peace process and in the EU itself. This would mean closely 
monitoring the peace process and mustering sufficient consensus within the EU to exert 
pressure on all sides, including on EU-member Cyprus. It also means delivering on the 
promises made to the Turkish Cypriots setting aside ill-founded EU concerns over 
recognition. Above all, it means proceeding with Turkey’s accession process and thus not 
allowing the quest for membership in Turkey to become a non-issue at best and the far-
fetched dream of marginalised and naïve reformists at worst. 
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